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Abstract: 
 
Why have different industrialized capitalist market economies developed such 
varying systems for social protection and social insurance? The hitherto most 
successful theory for explaining this is the Power Resource Theory (PRT), according 
to which the generosity of the welfare state is a function of working class 
mobilization. In this paper we argue however that there is an undertheorized link in 
the micro-foundations for PRT, namely why wage earners trying to handle the type of 
social risks and inequalities that are endemic for a market economy would turn to the 
state for the solution Our complementary approach, the Quality of Government (QoG) 
Theory, stresses the importance of trustworthy, reliable, impartial and reasonably 
uncorrupted government institutions as a precondition for citizens' willingness to 
support policies for social insurance and redistribution. Drawing on time-series cross-
sectional data on 18 OECD countries in 1984-2000, we find (a) that QoG positively 
affects the size and generosity of the welfare state, and (b) that the effect of working 
class mobilization on welfare state generosity is increasing in the level of QoG. 
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Introduction 
 
This article starts from a simple, yet important question: Namely, why have different 
industrialized capitalist market economies developed so very different systems for social 
protection and social insurance? This question has generated a huge amount of research over 
the last three decades and one reason for this is that the societies we have in mind share a 
number of basic structural, social, political and institutional features. This, one could argue, 
should have produced similarity and convergence in their levels of social protection and 
equality enhancing policies and not the huge and persisting, and in some cases increasing, 
differences that exist (Alber 2006; Goodin et al. 1999; Huber and Stephens 2001; Iversen 
2005; Kenworthy and Pontusson 2005; Korpi and Palme 1998; Lindbom 2001; Pontusson 
2005; Rothstein 1998; Scruggs and Allan 2006). For example, given that they are all 
culturally to be seen as western liberal market oriented democracies, the variation in their 
systems of social protection can hardly be explained by reference to basic historically 
inherited cultural traits that would result in generally held beliefs about what is just and fair, 
or what sort of risks should be handled by individual responsibility rather than by 
collective/public systems. As Larsen and others have shown, there is in fact very little that 
speaks for the notion that the variation between, for example, on the one hand the 
encompassing and universal character of the Scandinavian welfare states and on the other 
hand the residual and targeted system for social protection that exists in the United States can 
be explained by reference to variation in popular beliefs about social justice or wage 
inequalities (Larsen 2006; Larsen 2008).  
 
A different approach to the values/beliefs explanation would be to refer to the level and 
spread of religious beliefs in the population. However, if the extent and coverage of the 
welfare state would be connected to Christian values where humans are obliged to support the 
poor and the needy, then why are the most secular countries also the ones with the most 
extensive programs for economic support and why are they having the lowest percentage of 
children living in poverty (Norris and Inglehart 2004; Smeeding 2004)? One of the worlds 
richest and, among developed nations, most religious society, the United States, also has the 
highest percentage of children living in poverty and the highest percentage of newborns that 
do not reach their first birthday among the OECD countries. Simply put, why are the least 
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religious countries in the developed world the most generous to the least fortunate and most 
vulnerable of their members (Zuckerman 2008)?   
 
A more utility-based line of thought could start from neo-classical economic theory which 
should predict that given that these are all societies where the logic of the market dominates 
the economy, economic agents (workers, employers, unions, firms, associations, 
bureaucracies, etc.) should have acted on the basis of similar utility functions and perceptions 
about risks and their demand for protection from these risks and the following interactions 
should then have resulted in similar systems for social protection. Alternatively, the less 
efficient social insurance systems should by the logic of increased global economic 
competition have been weeded out by the more efficient ones. However, what we see is that 
the differences, both in terms of institutional configurations and coverage, are huge and stable 
(Alber 2006; Pontusson 2005; Swank 2002).  
 
One of the most successful approaches for explaining variation in the size and coverage of 
welfare states is the so-called Power Resource Theory (henceforth PRT), according to which 
this is largely a function of working class political mobilization (Huber and Stephens 2001; 
Korpi 1988).1 However, when PRT scholars reflect upon the importance of institutions for 
explaining variations in welfare states, they do not touch upon issues such as problems of 
legitimacy or quality of government. Instead, institutions are just seen as arenas for political 
conflicts generated by forces of social class or as useful political tools for the parties involved 
                                                 
1 The PRT has of course been challenged by other approaches as well, such as theories focusing on the 
importance of employers and cross-class alliances Mares, Isabela. 2003. The politics of social risk : business and 
welfare state development, Cambridge studies in comparative politics. Cambridge: Cambridge university press, 
Swenson, Peter. 2002. Capitalists against markets: The making of labor markets and welfare states in the United 
States and Sweden. New York: Oxford University Press., on variation in systems of skill formation Estevez-Abe, 
Margarita, Torben Iversen, and David Soskice. 2001. Social protection and the formation of skills: A 
reinterpretation of the welfare state. In Varieties of capitalism: The institutional foundations of comparative 
advantage, edited by P. A. Hall and D. Soskice. Oxford: Oxford University Press., on the importance of 
autonomous state bureaucracies Weir, Margaret, and Theda Skocpol. 1985. State Structures and the Possibilities 
for 'Keynesian' Responses to the Great Depression in Sweden, Britain, and the United States. In Bringing the 
State Back In, edited by P. B. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer and T. Skocpol. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press., and on the importance of electoral systems Iversen, Torben, and David Soskice. 2006. Electoral 
institutions and the politics of coalitions: Why some democracies redistribute more than others. American 
Political Science Review 100 (2):165-181.. In our evaluation of the debate, the latter three should be seen as 
complements and additions to the PRT Iversen, Torben, and John D. Stephens. 2008. Partisan politics, the 
welfare state, and three worlds of human capital formation. Comparative Political Studies 41 (4-5):600-637. or, 
as in the first case, has been successfully refuted Korpi, Walter. 2006. Power resources and employer-centered 
approaches in explanations of welfare states and varieties of capitalism - Protagonists, consenters, and 
antagonists. World Politics 58 (2):167-+, Paster, Thomas. 2009. Choosing Lesser Evils: The Role of Business in 
the Development of the German Welfare State from the 1880s to the 1990s (Diss.). San Domenica Di Fiesole 
(Florence): European University Institute, Department of Political and Social Science.. 
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in this struggle. In other words, in the PRT, institutional factors do not have an independent 
explanatory power (Korpi 2001).  
 
Our argument is precisely the opposite. In each country, the historically inherited government 
institutions,  have an important impact on the choice of both individual wage earners and their 
representatives whether or not to give the state the responsibility for extracting resources for 
and implementing policies for social insurance and welfare state redistribution. More 
precisely, this causal effect springs from the generally established perceptions and the 
following ideological and political discourses of the quality of the government institutions 
(Schmidt 2002; Schmidt 2009). We want to underline that the argument we will present is not 
a rebuttal of the power resource theory, however, but a complement to it. We agree that 
working class mobilization is a key to understanding welfare state expansion, but we clarify 
the hitherto neglected underlying condition for when this process is likely to take place: an 
environment of high quality of government. 
 
The argument will unfold in four steps. We first present the background, key virtues and our 
critique of the Power Resource Theory. We then present our own theoretical understanding of 
the problem – called the Quality of Government Theory – and state its observable 
implications. A section on data and research design is followed by a large-n test based on 
time-series cross-sectional data on 18 OECD countries in 1984-2000. We find (a) that QoG 
positively affects the size and generosity of the welfare state, and (b) that the effect of 
working class mobilization on welfare state generosity is increasing in the level of QoG. We 
end by discussing our conclusions. 
 
 
The Power Resource Theory – Appraisal and Critique 
 
The Power Resource Theory grew out of an effort by a group of scholars who during the late 
1970s tried to find a “middle way” between on the one hand the then popular Marxist-Leninist 
view that the welfare state should be understood as merely a functional requisite for the 
reproduction of the capitalist exploitation and on the other hand the idea that welfare states 
follow from a similar functionalist logic of modernization and industrialization. As a reaction 
against these functionalist explanations, the PRT puts forward two important issues. First, the 
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PRT scholars were the first to point out the variation in things like coverage, extension and 
generosity among existing welfare states and that this variation needed to be explained. 
Second, they introduced the importance of political mobilization based on social class as an 
explanation for this variation (Korpi 1974; Korpi 1983). Variation in welfare states reflects, 
according to this theory, “class-related distributive conflicts and partisan politics” (Korpi 
2006, p. 168). The more political resources the working class is able to muster, such as a 
strong and united union movement that gave electoral support to Labour or Social Democratic 
parties, the more extensive, comprehensive, universal and generous the welfare state would 
become (Esping-Andersen 1990).  The reason for this is according to the theory that the splits 
in the employment situation, that is a reflection of the class divisions, “generate interactions 
between class, life-course risks and resources, so that categories with higher life-course risks 
tend to have lower individual resources to cope with risks”. The argument is that such 
diversity of social risks would generate “a potential for class related collective action” (ibid). 
As stated in the introduction, we believe that this theory has been more successful than its 
contenders to explain the outcome that we are interested in (Allan and Scruggs 2004; Huber 
and Stephens 2001; Korpi and Palme 2003). 
 
The analytical problem in the Power Resource Approach that we would like to point out is 
that, while we agree that social class positions give rise to different social risks and that 
reasonably rational wage workers (and their representatives) would opt for some kind of 
protection from these risks, we still need an explanation for why they would turn to the state 
for such protection. There are, not only in theory, many other possibilities. First, unions or 
national union movements could have taken care of many of these risks and created large 
insurance organizations which also could have worked as “selective incentives” when 
recruiting and keeping members. Secondly, strong unions could have forced employers (or 
employers’ organizations) to take on either the whole or a part of the costs. A third possibility 
could have been that various “friendly societies”, or similar voluntary non-profit 
organizations, would have handled the demand for social protection. Another possibility could 
of course have been to rely on extended family networks. Our point is that in order for wage-
earners and their representatives to turn to the state for solving their demand for protection 
against social risks, they have to have a high degree of confidence in “their” state. We can 
easily see that from a Nordic or maybe North European perspective, this has rarely turned out 
to be an issue since there is much that speaks for that, compared to other European states even 
before the emergence of democracy, the Nordic states were historically less corrupt, less 
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clientelistic, less prone to use violence against their citizens and more open to popular 
influence than most Continental and South European States (Rothstein 2007). 
 
However, as will be shown below, in other countries the state turned out to be much more 
problematic for the union and labour movement. For example, at the beginning of the 20th 
century, the union movement in the United States encountered courts that systematically 
produced decisions that the unions thought of as hostile to their interests and this in turn 
changed the unions’ political strategy (Forbarth 1989; Hattam 1993). In France in 1905, a 
conservative government wanted to involve the unions in the administration of an 
unemployment insurance system, but remembering the bloody defeat of the Paris Commune 
in 1871, the radical unions refused to collaborate with the French state (Alber 1984).  On a 
more general level, while high levels of distrust in government authorities are rare in the 
Nordic countries, the opposite is true for much of the rest of the world, not least in developing 
and “transition” countries. This is probably due to high levels of corruption, clientelism and 
patronage and the effect of this distrust severely hampers the possibility for governments to a) 
collect taxes and b) deliver services to its population (Adésínà 2007; Brautigam, Fjeldstad, 
and Moore 2008; Holmberg, Rothstein, and Nasiritousi 2009; Kornai, Rothstein, and Rose-
Ackerman 2004; Riesco and Draibe 2007; Rothstein and Uslaner 2005; Sorj and Martuccelli 
2008). A close observer to the situation in Latin America has described this situation as 
follows:  
 
I don’t think there is any more vital issue in Latin America right 
now…. It’s a vicious cycle that is very hard to break. People don’t 
want to pay taxes because their government doesn’t deliver services, 
but government institutions aren’t going to perform any better until 
they have resources, which they obtain when people pay their taxes 
(Rother 1999) 
 
It should be noted that in the very early forms of “workers’ insurance” systems that were 
established in, for instance, Germany and Sweden, the question of the trustworthiness and 
legitimacy of the institutions that were to implement the policies was central. In both 
countries, the solution was to give trade unions representation in, and sometimes direct 
control over, the various insurance funds that was to handle the implementation of the system 
(Rothstein 1991; Steinmetz 1991). Moreover, in some cases, the unions could use this control 
as a form of “selective incentive” to increase their membership and thereby their 
organizational strength (Scruggs 2002; Western 2001).  
 8
 
The conclusion we draw from this is that the causal logic in the Power Resource Theory is too 
“monochrome” in its ontological foundations (Hall 2003). The idea of a linear causal logic 
between the degree to which wage-earners are politically mobilized and the size of the 
welfare state omits the existence of what has been called “feed-back mechanisms” (Soss and 
Schram 2007). By this we mean that it pays too little attention to the ramifying conditions 
under which the working class (or, more precisely, its political representatives) is likely to 
succeed in mobilizing support for social protection and/or redistribution by the state.  
 
 
 
What Happens When the State is Brought In? 
 
In her well-known book Protecting Soldiers and Mothers, Theda Skocpol (1992) shows that 
the welfare sector in the U.S. was quite large during the late 19th century. A central part of this 
was the pension system for war veterans who participated in the Civil War and their 
dependent family members, a program that during the decades after the end of the war 
became a huge operation both in terms of finances and the number of people that were 
supported. The problem, however, was that the system for deciding eligibility was 
complicated and entailed a large portion of administrative discretion. It is not difficult to 
imagine that what kind of health issues that should count as resulting from combat or military 
service in general. However, to determine what is due to the general bodily fragilities that 
comes with aging is a delicate and complicated problem to solve in each and every case. The 
result, as Skocpol writes, was that "the statutes quickly became so bewildering complex that 
there was much room for interpretation of cases" (Skocpol 1992, p. 121). What happened was 
that the war veteran pension administration became a source for political patronage: 
 
Because the very successes of Civil War pensions were so closely tied 
to the workings of patronage democracy, these successes set the stage 
for negative feedbacks that profoundly affected the future direction of 
U.S. social provisions. During the Progressive Era, the precedent of 
Civil War pensions was constantly invoked by many American elites 
as a reason for opposing or delaying any move toward more general 
old-age pensions.... Moreover, the party-based "corruption" that many 
U.S. reformers associated with the implementation of Civil War 
pensions prompted them to argue that the United States could not 
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administer any new social spending programs efficiently or honestly 
(Skocpol 1992, p. 59) 
 
 
The point Skocpol makes is that the reason for why the United States of today has a 
comparatively small, targeted and not very redistributive welfare state cannot be explained 
only by the lack of a Social Democratic type of labour movement or with references to 
normative ideals about the population being devoted to a “rugged individualism”. On the 
contrary, the U.S. welfare state was comparatively well developed at the beginning of the 20th 
century. But it was thereafter politically delegitimized due to what was generally perceived of 
as its low quality of government.   
 
In this paper we argue that Skocpol’s argument can be generalized. Many of the North 
European countries that during the first half of the 20th century started to develop 
encompassing welfare states had successfully increased their quality of government during the 
preceding century. Bavaria, Prussia, Britain, Denmark and Sweden, for example, carried out 
large scale changes in their government institutions that did away with systemic corruption 
and pervasive patronage during the 19th century and introduced impartial (meritocratic) 
systems for recruiting civil servants and handling the implementation of public policies (Frisk 
Jensen 2008; Harling 1996; Rothstein 2007; Rubinstein 1987; Weis 2005). These countries, 
when starting to build their welfare states, could thus start from a comparatively very 
advantageous position regarding how their citizens perceived the trustworthiness, competence 
and reliability of the government authorities that would be given the sensitive and intricate 
task to implement the policies (Rothstein and Uslaner 2005). It is also the case that when 
Swedish social reformers during the 1940s decided to move away from targeted social 
policies to universal ones, one reason they gave was that they wanted to avoid the type of 
discretionary implementation described by Skocpol and that they realized would de-legitimize 
the implementation of their welfare state policies (Rothstein 1998).  Detailed survey analyses 
have established that there is a positive feedback mechanism between having contacts with 
universal social programs and support for the welfare state also at the micro level, while 
contacts with institutions that wield a lot of discretion works the other way around (Kumlin 
2004, p. 201; cf. Kumlin and Rothstein 2005). 
 
Although Skocpol’s analysis was impressive, it dealt with just one (albeit important) case. It 
is noteworthy that, to our knowledge, in none but one of the literally hundreds of comparative 
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statistical analyses that have been produced during the last three decades in the welfare state 
research industry have we found any attempts to test the hypothesis originally launched by 
Skocpol.2 Interestingly enough, the problem of low quality of government is not mentioned 
even in recent works that argue for the need for welfare state research to move beyond the 
advanced industrial countries and focus more on the developing world (Carnes and Mares 
2007).  
 
 
 
The Quality of Government Theory about the Welfare State 
 
Making a living in a market economy is a situation that for most people carries a lot of well-
known risks, such as unemployment or having to pay for costly medical treatments. When 
facing risks, a rational response for most individuals is to try to find ways to get insurance or 
other forms of support.  Our starting point is to try to understand the micro-logic of the 
support for various social policy programs: how individual citizens and/or their political 
representatives may analyse and reason about how to handle the risks they (or the group they 
represent) are facing. 
 
It should be noted that welfare states are complicated systems and therefore not easy to 
theorize “in toto”. They usually have different systems for increasing equality, for redressing 
severe types of poverty and for handling social risks either for specific groups or for the 
whole, or very broad, segments of their populations. Thus, they are for redistribution as well 
as for insurance against risks (Iversen 2005, p. 21). However, as shown by for example Åberg 
(1989) and Korpi and Palme (1998), systems that are meant to be mostly redistributive may 
be less so than systems that are intended to be mostly about social insurance. As Moene and 
Wallerstein (2003) have argued, social insurance systems “generally provide insurance 
against a common risk on terms that are more favourable for low-income individuals than for 
high-income individuals” (p. 487). Moreover, if generally available services such as basic 
education, day-care, elderly care and health care are included, the redistributive effects of 
welfare state policies increase dramatically (Zuberi 2006). The reason is that even if taxation 
is proportional to income (and not progressive), costs for services are on average nominal and 
                                                 
2 The exception is Mares (2005), but she concentrates her theoretical argument on the importance of economic 
volatility. 
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the net effect of proportional taxation and nominal benefits is massive redistribution (Åberg 
1989).  The effect of this is that whether or not the welfare state is understood as provision of 
social protection, social services or social insurances, the overall tendency is that “more 
encompassing” generally implies increased redistribution. The same underlying micro-
foundations thus apply whether preferences for welfare state generosity are based on demand 
for insurance or redistribution, although we will mostly argue in terms of the former. 
 
Our starting point in micro-foundations does not imply that our theory rests on agents having 
“unrealistic” levels of competence concerning the ability to process and compute information. 
A welfare state is a complicated machinery and for most citizens it is very difficult to 
calculate the likelihood (or risk) that they will be winners or losers over their lifetime in this 
system. Inspired by Peyton Young’s work in evolutionary game theory, we believe that one 
cannot build models assuming that agents are “hyper-rational”, or have close to perfect 
information. As he states it, the requirement put on agents in standard rationalistic models “is 
a rather extravagant and implausible model of human behaviour”. Instead, we should realize 
that agents “base their decisions on fragmentary information, they have incomplete models of 
the process they are engaged in, and they may not be especially forward looking” (Young 
1998, p. 5f).  The implication is that the politically manufactured images (“collective 
memories”, “discourses”) of what type of agent “the state” is will be important when agents 
make decisions about whether to direct their demand for social protection towards the state 
(Schmidt 2009).   
 
This does not imply that we should think of the agents as irrational and more or less helpless 
victims of political manipulation of various forms of “false consciousness”. On the contrary, 
even though they are not fully informed and have to base their decisions on far from perfect 
information, agents in our model “adjust their behaviour based on what they think other 
agents are going to do, and these expectations are generated endogenously by information 
about what other agents have done in the past” (Young 1998, p. 6). Thus, since the welfare 
state is a mega-size collective action problem and since it involves strong normative 
standpoints regarding things like justice, desert, obligations and fairness, the individuals’ 
utility functions are not only based on calculations about individual utility (what’s in it for 
me?), but also at least as much on expectations about how the other agents are going to play 
(who are the others?).  
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Based on this reasoning, citizens (and political representatives) have to handle three dilemmas 
when deciding if they are going to support a social policy, for example unemployment 
insurance or public health care system. The first concerns the normative side of the question – 
namely whether such policies are to be considered as a “good thing”?  Secondly, and more 
important for our theory, for most citizens/wage earners, the enactment of welfare state 
policies implies that they will have to part with a substantial portion of their money through 
taxation or other forms of contributions. This they are only likely to accept under the 
condition that they believe that the system for taxation is run in a fair, uncorrupted, 
transparent non-discriminatory, impartial and competent manner (Scholz 1998). 
 
Moreover, it is reasonable to believe that the perceived quality of the institutions that are 
responsible for the implementation of the various programs play a role in this calculus. All 
systems of insurance have to be based on trust and, as is well known, trust is a delicate thing. 
In anonymous large-n systems like these, at least two complicated “trust games” are involved. 
Citizens have to trust that when they come into a situation where they need and are entitled to 
support, the system will actually deliver what it has set out to deliver. In some cases, we must 
think of this as a quite problematic “leap of faith”.  Not only is the demand here substantial in 
the sense that it concerns the quality of outcome, but it is in all likelihood also procedural. 
People do not only want to get just the “technical side” of, say, health care delivered to them 
according to professional standards. They also want to be respected, listened to and have 
rights to appeal when they believe that they have not been treated according to established 
standards of professionalism and fairness. In other words, the perceived level of procedural 
fairness is probably as important as the level of substantial fairness (Tyler 1998).  Using very 
detailed survey data from Sweden, one of the most encompassing welfare states in the world, 
Staffan Kumlin has shown that citizens’ direct experience from interactions with various 
social policy programs have a clear influence on their political opinions and, moreover, that 
such experiences are more important than citizens’ personal economic experiences when they 
form opinions about supporting or not supporting welfare state policies  (Kumlin 2004, p. 
199f). Based on a large survey from four Latin American countries, Mitchell Seligson 
concludes that the perceived level of corruption have strong negative effect on beliefs about 
the legitimacy of the government controlling for partisan identification (Seligson 2002). 
Using World Value Survey data from 72 countries, Bruce Gilley states that a set of variables 
measuring the quality of government (a composite of the rule of law, control of corruption 
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and government effectiveness) “has a large, even overarching, importance in global citizen 
evaluation of the legitimacy of states” (Gilley 2006, p. 57).  
 
In addition, many welfare state programs, both the ones that are intended to be redistributive 
and the ones that are more social insurance oriented, have to establish processes against 
overuse and outright abuse. For example, even people in favour of generous unemployment 
insurance are likely to demand that people who can work, and for whom there are suitable 
jobs, also work. Neither the level of tolerance for “free-riding” nor the willingness to stand as 
the “sucker” are generally very high. This is the third dilemma facing citizens in need of 
social protection. The issue whether the welfare state system will lead to an undermining of 
personal responsibility is thus important and such discourses can lead to a loss of legitimacy 
for the general idea of social protection by the state (Schmidt 2002; Townsend 1958). In other 
words, in order to be legitimate, the welfare state system should be able to distinguish 
between what should be personal risks for which agents have to take private responsibility, 
and risks for which they have the right to claim benefits (Paz-Fuchs 2008).  Those in favour 
of a generous system for work accident insurance or the right to early retirement for people hit 
by chronic illness may have legitimate reason to fear that such systems can be abused. Our 
point is that even people who are true believers in social solidarity and have a Social 
Democratic vision of society are likely to withdraw their support for an encompassing welfare 
state if these three requirements are not met. Put differently, their support is “contingent” 
upon how they view the quality of the public institutions that are to implement the programs 
(Levi 1998).  The quote below from John Rawls’ “A Theory of Justice” explains this moral 
logic well:  
 
For although men know that they share a common sense of justice and that 
each wants to adhere to existing arrangements, they may nevertheless lack 
full confidence in one another. They may suspect that some are not doing 
their part, and so they may be tempted not to do theirs. The general 
awareness of these temptations may eventually cause the scheme to break 
down. The suspicion that others are not honoring their duties and 
obligations is increased by the fact that, in absence of the authoritative 
interpretation and enforcement of the rules, it is particularly easy to find 
excuses for breaking them. (Rawls 1971. p.240). 
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In sum, we can think of this as citizens facing three interrelated dilemmas when they decide if 
they should support a policy for social insurance or redistribution: the question of the policy’s 
substantial justice, its procedural justice and the amount of “free-riding” that can be 
expected (Rothstein 2001). For example, an agent may agree that it is right to have universal 
health care, but still take a political stand against it because she believes the government is 
incapable of implementing such a program in accordance with her demands for procedural 
justice. One can think of the success antagonists against universal health care insurance in the 
U.S. have had in branding this policy “socialized medicine”. We would like to underline that 
these issues are likely to play a role not only, as is obvious, in programs that are modelled as 
social insurance systems but also in programs for redistribution. This is evident from the long-
standing discussion, especially in the U.S., about how to distinguish between the “deserving” 
and the “undeserving” poor (Katz 1989; Skocpol 1987). The welfare state contract, whether 
“new” or “old” is for the individual citizen both a contract with all other citizens (will they 
pay their taxes and refrain from abusing the system?) and with the government authorities 
(when the day to collect the insurance or service comes, will they deliver and, if so, in an 
acceptable way?). This can be thought of as the “moral economy” of the welfare state 
(Svallfors 2006; Svallfors 2007) 
 
We will leave the first normative question about a policy´s substantial justice out of the 
discussion and concentrate on the second and the third. Both these problems concern how the 
agents’ perceive the competence, honesty and trustworthiness of their government institutions 
that are to implement the policies in question. In a recent publication, we have conceptualized 
quality of government as founded on one basic norm, namely impartiality in the exercise of 
public power in the same vein as Robert Dahl has conceptualized democracy as based on 
“political equality” for the access to public power (Rothstein and Teorell 2008). This 
discussion is connected to the more recent focus in development studies and institutional 
economics on the importance of “good governance” (Acemoglu and Robinson 2008).  
 
Our central hypothesis is that without a reasonably high level of Quality of Government 
(henceforth QoG), political mobilization for welfare state policies in the way that PRT has 
outlined are not likely to get a broad appeal. We would again like to underline that we do not 
think of these approaches as mutually exclusive, but rather as complementing one another. In 
other words, both political mobilization according to PRT and a high level of QoG are 
necessary, but on their own they are not sufficient for creating an encompassing, universal 
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and thereby more redistributive welfare state. This has two implications for our initial 
question about how to explain the existing variation in systems of social policy. The first has 
to do with the origins of the welfare state system. If our theory is correct, we should expect 
countries with low QoG, that is, countries that have high levels of corruption in their 
government systems and/or that are characterized by clientelism and patronage, not to develop 
encompassing welfare states. Secondly, we should expect high QoG to work as a ramifying 
condition for the success of PRT. More precisely, the effect of working class mobilization on 
welfare state expansion should be increasing in the level of QoG. We will now take these two 
expectations to the data. 
 
 
Data and Research Design 
 
In order to test our hypothesis on a broader scope of observations than the historical U.S. case, 
we need measures of two things: the size of the welfare state and the quality of government. 
Starting with the former, the lion’s share of the large-n literature on determinants of the 
welfare state has relied on social spending data (see, e.g., Huber and Stephens 2001; Swank 
2002). Including government spending on both cash benefits and social service provisions, 
this is arguably a reasonable proxy for welfare state effort. Since the causal mechanism 
underlying our theory in part is based on the notion that ordinary citizens and/or their 
representatives refrain from entrusting the state with the kind of huge sums of money that an 
encompassing welfare state requires, this proxy actually suits our purposes well. As a first 
measure of welfare state development, we will therefore use total public social expenditure as 
a percentage of GDP from the OECD Social Expenditure Database (OECD 2007) on an 
annual basis from, taking missing data in the independent variables into account, 18 countries 
between 1984 and 2000.3 
 
True, there are well-known drawbacks involved in using social spending data. Some of these 
are more technical and hence more easily handled. For example, without proper controls for 
business cycles and the size of the target population, figures on social spending might tap into 
other phenomena than welfare state effort (see, e.g., Korpi and Palme 2003; Scruggs 2007). 
The more fundamental problem with the spending data however concerns their risk of being 
                                                 
3 If not otherwise indicated, all data used in this paper is taken from the QoG Social Policy Dataset (Samanni et. 
al 2008). 
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“epiphenomenal to the theoretical substance of welfare states” (Esping-Andersen 1990, p. 19). 
When an ordinary citizen ponders the social risks involved in being laid off from work, for 
example, he or she is likely to demand some form of unemployment protection scheme, not 
simply “increased social spending on the unemployed”. Similarly, when political parties and 
representatives propose new legislation to increase social protection for sickness leave, they 
frame their proposals in those words, and not in terms of the budgetary increases these 
reforms require. In Esping-Anderson’s (1990, p. 21) famous words, whereas social spending 
definitely taps into increased welfare efforts, “it is difficult to imagine that anyone struggled 
for spending per se”. 
 
For this reason, we will complement the social spending indicator with the hitherto most 
broad-ranging measure of welfare state based on actual social policy reforms rather than on 
their implied costs.4 This measure is Lyle Scrugg’s (2006) “benefit generosity index” that 
draws on detailed information on replacement rates, eligibility criteria and the size of the 
population that is insured against unemployment and sickness, and that participate in public 
pension schemes. The index theoretically varies from 0 to 64 and covers 18 countries annually 
from 1984 to 2000 (taking into account missing data in other variables). Since this index 
captures more directly the kinds of social policy reforms that are more likely to be 
implemented in systems with high QoG, we think of it as a more realistic proxy for the 
outcome our theory purports to explain. One potential drawback with the benefit generosity 
measure deserves mentioning, however, namely that it excludes the social service production 
part of the welfare state. 
 
Secondly, we of course need a measure of QoG. Although cross-national indicators of QoG or 
“good governance” have proliferated in recent years, only one of these gauges the quality of 
government institutions over a longer period of time: the International Country Risk Guide’s 
indicators (www.prsgroup.org). We need over-time (apart from cross-national) variation in 
QoG since the implication of our theory is that cumulative experience of the state, not one-
shot encounters, should be what matters (see more on this below). Three of the ICRG 
indicators are of particular interest to us and they are based on expert perceptions of risks to 
international business and financial institutions stemming from (a) corruption (e.g., special 
                                                 
4 The only other possible alternative cross-sectional time-series data source would be SOFI’s Social Citizenship 
Indicators Programme. Their data does however not include an overall index of welfare state generosity and 
they only cover 5-year intervals up until 1995. For these reasons, we prefer Scruggs’s data. 
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payments, bribes, excessive patronage, and nepotism), (b) law and order (e.g., weak and 
partial legal systems, low popular observance of the law), and (c) bureaucracy quality (lack of 
autonomous and competent bureaucrats). The ICRG indicators have a distinguished history in 
the field of cross-national measurement of QoG going back to at least Knack and Keefer 
(1995). We use the average of these three indicators, restricted to range from 0 (low) to 1 
(high quality), and cover the same 18 countries from 1984 to 2000 as our key independent 
variable in the subsequent analyses.5 
 
Ideally, we would of course have wanted to employ data on the quality of government that 
goes further back in history, to the build-up stage of the modern welfare state. However, 
unfortunately the time period our data covers is from the era of retrenchment from around the 
mid-1980s and onwards, when most social security provisions in the western world would 
have been scaled back. This poses a problem for the testing of our theory, since we believe the 
causal mechanism underlying our hypothesis relates to the political logic of welfare state 
expansion, not necessarily the logic of retrenchment. Our solution to this problem is to rely on 
levels, rather than changes, in the dependent variables. These levels may be viewed as a long-
run tally of all previous changes (positive or negative) in welfare state effort and should 
predominantly capture the extent of welfare state expansion rather than retrenchment.6  
 
This means that we fairly closely follow the methodological setup of Huber and Stephens 
(2001, chap. 3), which hitherto provides the most encompassing quantitative support for PRT 
as an explanation for welfare state expansion. This has the additional advantage of 
highlighting the more exact contribution from the quality of government factor. We also 
closely follow Huber and Stephen’s (2001) measurement strategy for the partisan variables, 
based on their own data (Huber et al. 2004): Left and Christian democratic cabinets, 
respectively, are the cumulative share of left/Christian Democratic party governments (or 
fraction of parliamentary seats for all coalition member parties in coalition governments) 
since 1946.7 The rationale for using the cumulative, rather than the annual, shares is again our 
                                                 
5 We have also experimented with each of the three indicators individually, but with no substantial change in 
results. 
6 The use of levels however comes at a serious cost, since it introduces substantial amounts of autocorrelation 
biasing our variance estimates. We correct for this with the Prais-Winsten transformation based on the 
assumption of an AR(1) error structure common to all countries. Beck and Katz’s (1995) heteroskedastic panel 
corrected standard errors take potential variation in the error structure across countries into account. Finally, it 
should be noted that all independent variables (except year dummies) are lagged one year. 
7 The cumulative cabinet variables are not included in the QoG Social Policy Dataset (Samanni et al 2008) and 
we have thus taken them directly from Huber et. al. (2004). 
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focus on long-term development. We do not expect for example a left-party cabinet to be able 
to substantially alter the welfare state effort in their country from one year to the next. But the 
longer time period that left parties have been in government in a country, the more expanded a 
welfare state we should expect to find. Following the same logic, we compute the cumulative 
scores of the quality of government variable as well (in this case the cumulative mean rather 
than the cumulative sum). The quality of government factor each year thus reflects the entire 
history of quality of government for that particular country since the first year of 
measurement (that is, 1984). We believe this measurement strategy resonates well with the 
cognitive mechanisms on which our theory is based, since citizens or their representatives are 
likely to judge the trustworthiness of their state institutions not as a single-shot evaluation at 
each time point but rather as a running tally of previous experiences.8 
 
Finally, we include a set of control variables in our analyses. Globalization is measured with 
two variables: openness to trade (Heston, Summers, and Aten 2002) and an index of the 
liberalization of the regulation of capital and current transactions (Huber et al. 2004; 
originally from Quinn 1997). To control for business cycles, we include measures of 
unemployment and budget deficits as a percentage of GDP (Armingeon et al. 2008; IMF 
2008).9 Huber and Stephens (2001) have shown that female labor force participation has a 
significant effect on the expansion of the welfare state and we therefore include a measure of 
the percentage of women in the labor force (OECD 2006). Constitutional veto points can be 
theorized to hinder welfare state expansion. To control for this, we have used an additive 
index based on federalism, presidentialism, bicameralism, and frequent use of referenda 
(Huber et al. 2004; Huber and Stephens 2001, 55f). Finally, we control for the percentage of 
the population above 65 years of age, GDP per capita and inflation (Heston, Summers, and 
Aten 2002; OECD 2007; WorldBank 2007). 
  
Again, most of these variables can only be expected to influence the level of the welfare state 
effort in the long run, and they will therefore be measured cumulatively. We closely follow 
Huber and Stephens  (2001) and measure the following variables as the cumulative mean 
from the first year of observation: liberalization of capital and current transactions, female 
labor force participation, constitutional veto points, population above 65 and inflation. A few 
                                                 
8 Since the use of levels in the dependent variable and cumulative scores for the independent variables may 
introduce a spurious correlation of time trends, all results are controlled for year-fixed effects (or year dummies). 
9 The IMF data on budget deficits is not included in the QoG Social Policy Dataset (Samanni et. al. 2008) and 
has been taken directly from IMF (2008). 
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of the variables can be argued to influence the extent of the welfare state in the shorter run: A 
higher rate of unemployment means more recipients which raises social spending without 
making the system more generous.10 The same applies to openness to trade which has been 
said to increase workers sense of risk of being displaced (Huber and Stephens 2001, p. 63; 
Mares 2005). GDP is not only the resource base for expanding the welfare state in the first 
place, but also the denominator in the spending measurement, and this is why short-term 
changes can be expected to influence our dependent variable. Finally, we expect that budget 
deficits tend to force governments to make cuts in the welfare state in the short run and the 
budget deficit variable is therefore not measured cumulatively. Basic descriptive information 
on all variables is available in the Appendix. 
 
 
Results 
 
To provide an illustration of the patterns we observe, we start by presenting two graphs to 
give a more visual feel for the data. Figure 1 displays the positive relation at the country level 
between QoG and the level of welfare state effort, measured as the benefit generosity index. 
Both the QoG and the welfare state measures are here computed as the mean value of all 
observations 1984-2002 for each country. As our theory would predict, we observe the 
encompassing Scandinavian welfare state to the upper right, that is, among countries with 
both high levels of QoG and benefit generosity. On the other side of the spectrum, however, 
are countries with lower QoG and smaller welfare states, such as Italy and Japan, and they are 
located to the lower left. 
 
***** FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE ***** 
 
Figure 2 illustrates how QoG works as a ramifying condition for the effect of cabinet 
partisanship on welfare state generosity. The graph presents data for all the available country 
year observations 1984-2002 in the 18 OECD countries for which we have data. In the figure 
we have divided the observations into two equally sized groups based on their value on the 
                                                 
10 One could argue that unemployment only is likely to affect the level of social spending and not so much the 
actual social policy reforms as measured by Scrugg’s benefit generosity index. Unemployment is e.g. not 
included as a control variable in Allan and Scruggs (2004). However, we have chosen to include unemployment 
as a control variable irrespective of the dependent variable used, to keep all our models as similar as possible. 
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QoG variable (the cumulative mean): the high-QoG observations in black, the low-QoG in 
grey. The two regression lines track the relationship between left cabinets and the benefit 
generosity index for these two groups, respectively. As we can see, both regression lines are 
positive; in the group of observations with low QoG as well as in the group with high QoG 
the relation between left cabinets and the benefit generosity index is positive. However, the 
dark grey regression line, representing the group with high QoG, is steeper than the light grey 
regression line. This means that the effect of left cabinets on the benefit generosity index is 
bigger in the group with high QoG than in the one with low QoG. Thus, the effect of left 
cabinets on the level of welfare state effort is dependent on the level of QoG. 
 
***** FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE ***** 
 
We now turn to the more systematic evidence underpinning these descriptive relationships. In 
table 1 we display four empirical models that together show how QoG is part of the 
explanation of the generosity of the welfare state. The models again include all 18 OECD 
countries 1984-2000. In model (1) and model (2) we use social spending as our dependent 
variable. Model (1), where QoG is not included, confirms that our data is in line with PRT. 
That is, as predicted, both the left cabinet and the Christian democratic cabinet variables are 
positively related to social spending. 
 
***** TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE ***** 
 
Turning to model (2), our main hypothesis is confirmed. QoG has a positive and significant 
effect on the level of welfare state effort measured as spending. Since the QoG variable has a 
theoretical variation of between 0 and 1, it is easy to interpret the coefficient: the model 
predicts that a country with the best possible level of QoG will spend 21 percentage units 
more of its GDP on the welfare state compared to a country with the lowest possible level of 
QoG. This can be compared to the mean level of social spending of the observations in the 
model which, incidentally, is 21 percent of GDP. 
 
In addition, model (2) shows that both left and Christian democratic cabinets still have a 
positive effect on the level of social spending when QoG has been included in the model. The 
effect of left cabinets, however, is almost halved, while the effect of the Christian democratic 
cabinet becomes somewhat bigger. The implication of this is that previous tests of PRT, 
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where QoG has not been controlled for, have overestimated the effect that left cabinets exert 
on welfare state expansion and underestimated the effect of Christian democratic cabinets. 
The probable reason for this is that left parties have held power for longer spells  in high-QoG 
countries like, for example, the Scandinavian countries as compared to their lower-QoG 
counterparts in southern Europe. 
 
Turning to model (3) and model (4) of table 1 we instead use the benefit generosity index 
from Scruggs (2006) as our dependent variable. The results from model (1) and (2) are 
repeated. Without QoG in the model, left and Christian democratic governments have a 
significant and positive effect on the generosity of the welfare state (model 3). The effect of 
left cabinets is however reduced by one third when QoG is introduced in the model and the 
effect of Christian democratic cabinets increases by two thirds (model 4). In model (4) our 
main hypothesis is, again, confirmed in that QoG is positively related to the dependent 
variable. Since the benefit generosity index is pretty complex in its construction, it is harder to 
make a substantial interpretation of the magnitude of this effect. We may however compare 
the effect of QoG with the mean value and the empirical variation of our dependent variable. 
In the observations used in model (4), the minimum value of the benefit generosity index is 
17, the maximum value is 45 and the mean value is 28. A country with the highest possible 
level of QoG will, according to the model, have a benefit generosity index that is 35 units 
higher than a country with the lowest possible level of QoG. 
 
In sum, model (1) - (4) confirm our main hypothesis. QoG has a significant and positive effect 
on the level of welfare state effort, regardless of whether our dependent variable is 
operationalized through spending on the welfare state or through the benefit generosity index. 
However, the effect of the cabinet partisanship still holds when QoG is included in the model. 
The Power Resource Theory is therefore complemented rather than refuted. 
 
We now turn to the more systematic test of our second and supplementary hypothesis that the 
size of the effect of cabinet partisanship is conditional on the level of QoG. Table 2 presents 
this result with regression estimates, still for the 18 OECD countries 1984-2000 and using the 
same control variables as in Table 1. The two interaction variables are simply the QoG 
variable multiplied with the left and Christian democratic cabinet variables respectively. The 
coefficients for these interaction terms should be interpreted as the effect QoG exerts on the 
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effect of either type of cabinet. In other words, if this second hypothesis proves correct, then 
we should expect a positive and significant interaction term. 
 
***** TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE ***** 
 
It turns out that this hypothesis is in part confirmed. There is a positive and significant 
interaction effect when the welfare state level is measured with the benefit generosity index 
(model 6), but not when it is measured as spending on the welfare state (model 5). In other 
words, the positive relationship between left and Christian cabinets and spending on the 
welfare state does not vary with the level of QoG. However, the effect of left cabinets on 
benefit generosity increases with higher QoG. This means our hypothesis is at least confirmed 
in the model with the most realistic proxy for welfare state effort.11 
 
There is one more indication that the first hypothesis, on the general effect of QoG on welfare 
state expansion, is the more robust of the two: It holds even when all cross-country variation 
has been partialled out through the use of country-fixed effects (a rather hard test considering 
that our variables are pretty stable over time). In this case the QoG variable holds up as an 
explanation of the level of welfare state effort, regardless of what operationalization is used 
for the dependent variable. Our hypothesis on the interaction effect does however not stand 
this robustness test. 
 
 
 
 
 
Discussion 
 
One way to evaluate the strength of a social science theory is to ask how well it “travels”. The 
more cases it can explain, the stronger it stands. In this case, the Power Resource Theory has 
been shown to be fairly good in explaining the extent and institutionalization of social policies 
                                                 
11 One might suspect that the reason for this is that the contingent effect of left cabinets only holds for social 
insurance but not for social service provision (since the benefit generosity index does not capture the latter). A 
more fine-grained analysis however reveals that this is not the case. Our second hypothesis is neither confirmed 
when spending on service or cash transfers are used as dependent variable.  
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in 18 western OECD countries which of course is important. However, it should be reminded 
that this is about ten percent of the total number of countries in the world comprising less than 
fifteen percent of the world’s population. According to all cross-country empirical indicators 
that measures Quality of Government, the 18 western OECD countries that have been the 
focus of the PRT have comparatively high levels of QoG (cf. Samanni et al. 2008). While our 
results show that the QoG theory serves as a necessary complement to the PRT for the above 
mentioned developed countries, it seems reasonable to argue that the importance of QoG for 
establishing an encompassing welfare state would increase the more we move to countries in 
other regions of the world, such as, for example, Latin America or Sub-Saharan Africa. Given 
the rampant corruption and clientelism in countries like, for example, Brazil, it is unlikely that 
we will see the enactment of a North European type of welfare state, even if they have would 
have leftist governments for an extended period (Sorj and Martuccelli 2008; Weyland 1996). 
As Rudra states it, politicians in these countries are inclined to use the welfare systems for 
patronage politics “by appointing teachers, health and social workers in exchange for political 
support” (Rudra 2004. p. 699). The same can be said of several countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (Adésínà 2007; Samson 2002).  Thus, the further away from the 18 developed 
countries our two theories travel, our presumption is that the Quality of Government Theory 
will become more important than the Power Resource Theory for explaining variations in 
social protection through the state.    
We would like to end with an illustration of how we believe the micro-level causal logic 
operates in the QoG theory. In her recent (and fascinating) book about the former head of the 
Anti-Corruption Agency in Kenya, Joseph Githongo, the British journalist Michaela Wrong 
tells the story about how Githongo, after having revealed the existence of massive and 
systemic corruption among the highest ranking politicians in the Cabinet and not receiving 
any support from the President for going further with his allegations, decided that he had to 
flee the country. Based on interviews with Githongo and other sources, Wrong describes how, 
in Kenya, ethnic loyalties trumps all other political allegiances giving rise to widespread 
corruption, clientelism and distrust of the state as anything but a source for graft.  
However, Wrong, who has long experience from reporting from Kenya, does not solely 
attribute these malfunctions to a specific African or Kenyan political culture. Instead, she goes 
to her own background as a child growing up in London with an Italian mother and an English 
father. In the book, she recalls how her parents thought of moral duties, generosity, personal 
obligations and compassion in totally different ways. Her Italian mother grew up in a country 
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that had turned the state into a fascist apparatus and, moreover, had formed a political alliance 
with Nazi Germany leading to war and occupation. After the war she experienced “a 
seemingly endless series of short-lived, sleaze-ridden administrations”. This experience 
resulted in an “utterly cynical” view of the state and its officials. Her mother, according to 
Wrong, would “happily have lied and cheated in any encounter with the state had she believed 
she could get away with it”. However, Wrong continues to describe her mother as utterly 
devoted to helping others in need and spending lots of time and energy to support also distant 
relatives and friends in an extended social network. “Hers was a world of one-on-one 
interactions in which obligations, duties, morality itself took strictly personal forms and were 
no less onerous for it.” However, her obligations and duties ended where her network ended, 
“beyond lay utter darkness”. Her mother’s approach, writes Wrong, “would have made 
perfect sense to any Kenyan”.  
     Wrong then describes her father as the typical middle-class law-abiding Englishman “for 
whom a set of impartial, lucid rules represented civilization at its most advanced”. She 
describes how, when she was about eleven, with a certain pride mentioned to him that she 
usually managed to free-ride on the bus home from school. His reaction was stern disapproval 
telling her that “if everyone behaved that way, London Transport would grind to a halt”. For 
Wrong’s father, the choice stood between “civic ethos and anarchy”. In contrast to his Italian 
wife, “he felt no obligation to provide for nieces and nephews” and had a relative applied for 
a job at the National Health Service administration in which he worked and were he made 
such appointments “he would have immediately excused himself”. For her English father, 
“nothing could be more repugnant… than asking a friend to bend the rules as a personal 
favour” (Wrong 2009, p 54f).  
       The point Michaela Wrong (and we) wants to make is that the state’s historical record (or 
in a game-theoretical terminology, the state’s “history of play”) creates a kind of collective 
memory within its population that can be expected to determine what Douglass North has 
labelled “mental models” which influences whether or not people are likely to trust the state 
to deliver what it has set out to deliver (North 1998).  Given the historical record of the Italian 
and the British state, none of the “templates” described by Wrong can be thought of as 
irrational. However, while the “Italian” (or “Kenyan”) template on its own can be thought of 
as rational, it is likely to produce a result that stands against the collective rationality.       
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Table 1. Regression Estimates for Quality of Government in 18 OECD Countries 1984-2000 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Social Spending 
(% of GDP) 
Social Spending 
(% of GDP) 
Benefit 
Generosity 
Index 
Benefit 
Generosity 
Index 
Quality of Government  21.3***  35.6*** 
  (4.24)  (5.19) 
     
Left Cabinet 0.23*** 0.13** 0.38*** 0.26*** 
 (5.93) (3.08) (6.58) (4.57) 
     
Christian Democratic 
Cabinet 
0.12*** 0.15*** 0.12* 0.20*** 
 (3.57) (4.12) (2.41) (4.81) 
     
Openness to Trade -0.011 -0.022* 0.069*** 0.054*** 
 (-1.04) (-2.11) (4.31) (3.71) 
     
Liberalization of Capital 
and Current Transactions 
1.16*** 0.93*** 1.04*** 0.77** 
 (5.55) (4.14) (3.61) (2.87) 
     
Constitutional Veto Points -1.11*** -0.92*** -1.46*** -1.54*** 
 (-5.77) (-4.74) (-4.38) (-5.17) 
     
Budget Deficit / Surplus -0.088* -0.12** -0.013 -0.054 
 (-2.30) (-2.86) (-0.29) (-0.97) 
     
GDP per Capita -0.24* -0.35*** 0.46** 0.50*** 
 (-2.42) (-3.35) (3.22) (3.74) 
     
Female Labor Force 
Participation 
0.13* 0.11 0.16** 0.13** 
 (2.35) (1.70) (2.67) (2.65) 
     
Inflation 0.10 0.70*** 0.16 0.76** 
 (0.57) (3.92) (0.58) (2.89) 
     
Population above 65 0.30 0.72** -0.31 0.040 
 (1.41) (2.96) (-1.04) (0.14) 
     
Unemployment 0.082 -0.011 0.00095 -0.046 
 (1.28) (-0.14) (0.01) (-0.54) 
N 339 279 353 285 
R2 0.85 0.89 0.83 0.89 
t statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Comments: Prais-Winsten’s regression with heteroskedastic panel corrected standard errors and AR1 
autocorrelation structure. Year dummies are included in the model. Most independent variables are measured 
cumulatively (see text). All independent variables are lagged one year (except year dummies). 
 26
Table 2. Regression Estimates for Interaction Effect of Cabinet Partisanship and Quality of 
Government in 18 OECD Countries 1984-2000 
 (5) (6) 
 Social Spending 
(% of GDP)  
Benefit Generosity 
Index 
QoG – Left Interaction -0.56 1.92* 
 (-0.95) (2.48) 
   
QoG – Christian Democrat 
Interaction 
0.13 -0.014 
 (0.47) (-0.04) 
   
Quality of Government 24.5** 18.9 
 (2.87) (1.67) 
   
Left Cabinet 0.67 -1.57* 
 (1.21) (-2.16) 
   
Christian Democratic Cabinet 0.046 0.18 
 (0.19) (0.58) 
   
Openness to Trade -0.024* 0.052*** 
 (-2.12) (3.39) 
   
Liberalization of Transactions 0.91*** 0.85** 
 (3.80) (3.17) 
   
Constitutional Veto Points -0.94*** -1.53*** 
 (-4.62) (-5.20) 
   
Budget Deficit / Surplus -0.12** -0.050 
 (-2.84) (-0.90) 
   
GDP per Capita -0.32** 0.44** 
 (-2.80) (3.10) 
   
Female Labor Force Particip. 0.13 0.075 
 (1.75) (1.39) 
   
Inflation 0.82*** 0.44 
 (3.76) (1.43) 
   
Population above 65 0.69** 0.090 
 (2.76) (0.30) 
   
Unemployment -0.0064 -0.054 
 (-0.08) (-0.62) 
N 279 285 
R2 0.89 0.89 
t statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Comments: Prais-Winsten’s regression with heteroskedastic panel corrected standard errors and AR1 
autocorrelation structure. Year dummies are included in the model (coefficients not reported). Most independent 
variables are measured cumulatively (see text). 
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Figure 1. Benefit Generosity and Quality of Government in 18 OECD Countries 1984-2002 
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R2 = 0.25, b = 53, P>|t| = 2.32. Sources: Scruggs (2006); ICRG 
Comments: Both the QoG measure and the benefit generosity index are here computed as the mean value of all observations 
1984-2002 for each country. 
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Figure 2. Illustration of the Interaction in 18 OECD Countries 1984-2002 
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Sources: Scruggs (2006); Huber et al (2004) 
Comments: Each dot represents one country and year (e.g. Sweden 1984). The observations are split into two equally sized 
groups based on their level of QoG. The regression lines show that the effect of left cabinets on the benefit generosity index 
is bigger for the observations with high QoG than for the observations with low QoG. 
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Descriptives 
 
    Standard deviation 
Variable Mean Min value Max value Overall std. 
dev. 
Between std. 
dev 
Within std. 
dev 
       
Social Spending 
(% of GDP) 21 11 36 5.4 5.1 1.7 
       
Benefit 
Generosity 
Index 
28 17 45 7.2 7.0 1.7 
       
Quality of 
Government 
0.94 0.75 1 0.067 0.067 0.010 
       
Left Cabinet 15 0 45 11 11 2.0 
       
Christian 
Democratic 
Cabinet 
8.5 0 40 12 13 1.0 
       
Openness to 
Trade 63 14 186 32 30 12 
       
Liberalization of 
Capital and 
Current 
Transactions 
11 6.6 14 1.8 1.9 0.36 
       
Constitutional 
Veto Points 1.5 0 6 1.8 1.8 0.034 
       
Budget Deficit / 
Surplus -2.4 -12 11 3.8 2.4 3.0 
       
GDP per Capita 21 11 33 3.4 2.7 2.1 
       
Female Labor 
Force 
Participation 
53 35 70 9.1 9.0 1.8 
       
Inflation 5.8 2.4 13 1.7 1.7 0.61 
       
Population 
above 65 12 7.7 16 2.1 2.1 0.3 
       
Unemployment 7.5 0.46 17 3.6 3.0 2.1 
 
Note: The “Between std. dev.” is the standard deviation between countries, that is when the year variable is held 
constant. The “Within std. dev.” is the standard deviation over time, that is when the country variable is held 
constant. 
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